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Introduction
The importance of imperfect competition and of multinational activity on trade have both attracted a large amount of research in the last decades. In general, the theoretical models obtain the result that more competition in terms of the number of active firms fosters trade. The now standard models of trade and multinationals (MNEs; compare Helpman, 1984 , Markusen and. Venables, 1998 , 2000 , Baldwin et al., 1999 come up with the basic result that vertical MNE activity fosters trade (complementarity), whereas horizontal MNE activity mitigates trade (substitution; see Caves, 1996 , for an overview).
This paper analyses the impact of both market concentration -measured by the EU12 market share of the largest five firms active on this market -and multinationality (Davies and. Lyons, 1996) -measured by the distribution of production activities of an industry's large MNEs across EU12 member countries -on bilateral intra-EU12 manufacturing goods exports in a unified framework. The main hypotheses are based on a partial equilibrium bilateral dumping Cournot model of trade and horizontal multinationals. In this theoretical model, the relationship between market concentration and trade is not clear-cut but it inter alia depends on the relative cost advantage of the source country and transport costs. Consequently, the role of market concentration remains an empirical question. Multinationality should exert a negative impact on industry exports. This is investigated in a panel of bilateral NACE 3-digit intra-EU12 manufacturing industry trade flows. There is strong evidence, that an increase in concentration in the EU12 area has fostered intra-EU12 trade. In contrast, an industry's intra-EU12 multinationality has exerted a negative impact. The simulation analysis illustrates that the observed change in market concentration and in multinationality have mitigated intra-EU12 manufacturing goods trade activity. The change in concentration has induced an equalisation effect on trade shares in terms of a redistribution of trade activity away from the core countries. However, the change in multinationality is responsible for a polarisation of trade activity within the EU12, improving the importance of trade (i.e. trade shares) of the northern EU economies at the expense of their the southern counterparts. In sum, the polarisation effect is stronger and outweighs the equalisation effect. Hence, the change in concentration and multinationality altogether have favoured the goods export activity within and between the core EU and the northern EU periphery at the cost of the southern EU periphery economies.
Theoretical Background
The theoretical literature on imperfect competition and trade is organised around models of oligopolistic and (mostly) monopolistic competition. The former are mainly analyzed in a partial equilibrium framework with two countries and a single standardised commodity (compare Brander, 1981, and Markusen, 1981 , as two prominent examples). Most monopolistic competition models are analysed in a general equilibrium context and consider firms competing in differentiated varieties of a particular commodity class (see Krugman, 1979 Krugman, , 1980 , for the earliest examples).
The theoretical hypotheses to be tested in the empirical section are de-rived from a partial equilibrium Cournot model of trade and multinationals (compare Martin, 1993 , for a similar model in the duopoly case). However, I do not discuss the question of entry and focus on a short-term perspective.
In the long-run, a co-existence of MNEs and exporters is more difficult to establish.
Footloose, horizontal multinational firms (MNEs) run a single plant in each market. This implies that multinationals do not engage in trade. Markets are treated as segmented and the industry (inverse) demand curves are allowed to differ with respect to market size (a) across countries:
where q denotes consumption of goods from plants, which are located at the same market as consumers, and x is consumption of goods from the foreign market (i.e. exports from there). Furthermore, n is the number of footlose exporters (exporting from both markets), and m is the number of MNEs. For simplicity, I assume that the number of exporters in each market is the same, since there is also no information available on this. Exporters in different markets only differ in terms of their sales and cost. Using the assumption that exporters and MNEs produce the same quantity for the market, where their plants are located (compare also Markusen and. Venables, 1998 , 2000 , profits are given by
4 with c denoting marginal cost. Solving the system of first order conditions gives solutions for all quantities of interest (q i , q j , x i , x j )
with e n = 2n + m. In the empirical part below, we are interested in the determinants of exports from country i to j at the industry level defined by
with m = θe n and 2n/e n = (1 − θ) so that n = (1 − θ)e n/2. According to (7), we can formulate the following proposition regarding the comparative statics for exports from country i to j.
Proposition 1 An increase in foreign market size (a j ) or the cost difference in favour of country i (c j − c i ) exerts a positive impact on nx i . An increase in domestic marginal costs (c i ), the transport costs (t), or the share of multinationals (θ) in the overall number of firms (e n) ceteris paribus affects nx i negatively. Industry exports from country i to j are not uniquely related to changes in the overall number of firms (e n).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Of course, the overall number of firms (e n) and the share of multinationals (θ) are not directly observable. However, we have information on the market concentration (the share of the largest five firms) in each industry on the EU12 market (C) and the multinationality (M ) in each industry in terms of multi-plant activities within the EU12 market. The latter is approximated by the entropy index of multinational production of the large firms (compare Davies and. Lyons, 1996) . Below, we associate an increase in C with a decrease e n and an increase in M with an increase in θ.
Accordingly, we can formulate two propositions with respect to the relationship between e n and θ on the one hand and C and M on the other.
Proposition 2 An increase in the number of firms reduces C at any given level of M . Therefore, an increase in C (i.e. a decrease in e n) is not uniquely related to bilateral exports, but it inter alia depends on the cost advantage of country i (c j −c i ) and the transport costs (t). The larger c j −c i (or the smaller t), the more likely is an increase in concentration (C) negatively related to bilateral exports (nx i ).
Proof. Follows directly from the proof of Proposition 1. Proof. Follows directly from the proof of Proposition 1.
We can summarise the comparative static results derived in the appendix as follows. It is evident from (7) 
Empirical Analysis
The empirical literature on the relationship between competition and trade is relatively scarce and predominantly provides evidence for the US. Caves 8 to only leading firms, there is some underrepresentation of mulitnational activity by smaller mutlinationals. Therefore, the empirical results should be interpreted with care.
I interpolate the series to obtain an estimate of C and M for 1990, which is the first year (reliable) trade data are available on. Additionally, the data on concentration and multinationality are collected for only 72 industries (aggregates of NACE 3-digits). I appropriately weight them to construct a data base, which can be imputed to come up with NACE 3-digit data.
As usual, trade costs are proxied by the use of the relation between c.i.f. The determination of industry exports demands for the inclusion of a couple of interaction effects between the involved exogenous determinants (compare the previous section). The estimated specification reads
where X ijk is the volume of exports from country i to j of industry k in year t (nx ijk ), and subscripts i, j, k and t refer to exporter country, importer country, industry and year. d ijkt = (log c jkt − log c ikt ) is the difference in the log of unit labour costs at the two markets. µ ijk is the individual bilateral and industry specific effect, which comprehensively accounts for time-invariant cross-sectional (observable and unobservable) influences, λ t is the time effect, which wipes out all, e.g. cyclical, variation common for all cross-sectional units-for example, in 1993 the single market program came into effect -and ε ijkt is the classical error term. All variables are in logs.
> Pirotte, 1999) estimation results from a regression of (8) using the described data. Model 1 reflects the fixed effects coefficients from the full set-up as described in (8). Models 2 and 3 are parsimonious versions, where the insignificant coefficients of Model 1 are set to zero. According to the choice of a two-way panel, the estimated fixed effects coefficients can be interpreted as narrow within group impacts (similar to first difference analysis). Noteworthy, this is impossible in a four-way framework with industry, exporter, importer and time effects.
The parameter estimates are very robust and the majority of the estimated main coefficient signs is in accordance with our theoretical hypotheses.
An increase in market power has a clear positive, direct impact on bilateral intra-EU industry exports in both the short-term and the long-term perspective. In contrast, a higher multinationality exerts an insignificant, negative Fredriksson (1996) provide an interesting result for exports from affiliates.
Foreign subsidiaries export the more, the fewer the countries in which their parents have affiliates. This could also be related to our finding, although information on firm data cannot be exploited, here.
The marginal effects not only differ across industries but also across bilateral relations and years, due to the differences in the cost advantage (d) and transportation costs (t) across industries. Therefore, the impact of the observed change in concentration and multinationality deserves some additional assessment. We can ask, how intra-EU trade would have developed over the period 1990-1997 if either concentration or multinationality had not changed since 1990. Then, the difference between the predicted growth in manufacturing trade for the observed development and the simulated counterfactual scenario is attributable to the observed change in concentration (multinationality), exclusively.
> Table 3 < Table 3 presents the results from the simulation analysis of the impact of the observed change in concentration (multinationality) on intra-group real bilateral volume of manufacturing trade (VT) growth using Model 2.
Note that the predictions are only calculated for industry-country-pair crosssections, which are not missing in both 1990 and 1997. The reported real growth rates of trade are based on these cross-sections. The difference between the predictions for the observed and counterfactual world data should be interpreted as short-term effects of the observed change in concentration or multinationality, respectively.
On average, VT grew by about 50% over the whole period (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) . The main reason behind the differences between the effects across integration groups is the difference in the observed levels and changes in the cost difference and, especially, trade costs. Noteworthy, the reported growth rates of these two variables are not weighted. Weighting them by concentration or multinationality (not reported) results in a shift of the growth rates, which on average is in favour of EU integration of the core and the North.
Hence, mainly the difference in the level and change in trade costs drives the differences in the effects of concentration and multinationality. Changes in an industry's multinationality were strongest in those industries, where transportation costs are high.
> Table 4 <
In order to assess the effects on intra EU12 integration, the comparison of the 1997 intra-group VT shares from the observed and the counterfactual scenario in overall intra-EU12 trade is appropriate. It normalises the overall volume of trade and concentrates on the relative weight of the respective intra-group trade. Again, the simulations are drawn on the results from Model 2. The observed changes in the weights of the respective EU-country group shares are small, since the underlying period is relatively short. Therefore, Table 4 reports the difference in terms of signs between the respective group share in real manufacturing VT for the observed and the simulated scenario. "-" indicates that the share was reduced according to the observed change in concentration (multinationality) since 1990, and "+" means that it was increased. Accordingly, Table 4 provides information about the redistribution of VT within the EU12 area, which is only due to the change in concentration (multinationality). From the second column of the table, we see that real VT within the core EU6 and between the peripheries (EU-North and EU-South) has lost importance in favour of trade within the peripheries and of the EU6 members with the peripheries because of the change in concentration, i.e. a < (b + c + d + e + f ) in terms of labels in Table 4 . This could be interpreted as an equalisation effect of concentration in intra-EU exports. To some extent, the change in multinationality had the opposite effect and it dominates the impact of concentration. In general, the increase in multinationality has favoured the integration within and between the core and the North rather than the South, i.e. (d + e + f ) < 0. This could be called the polarisation effect of multinationality. In sum, polarisation was stronger than equalisation, and the southern EU economies' intra-EU12 trade relations were reduced in relative terms due to the change in concentration and multinationality altogether. Hence, the increase in multinationality has reduced goods trade, and it has reallocated intra-EU12 trade activity from the southern EU economies to the core and the northern periphery.
Conclusions
For the first time, this paper provides insights in the importance of both market concentration and multinationality for intra-EU12 manufacturing goods and 1997 as given, I undertake two simulations to figure out their overall effect on EU12 integration in terms of manufacturing goods trade. There is strong evidence that intra-EU12 trade growth has been mitigated because of both the change in market concentration and in multinationality with the latter much more important. Moreover, the change in market concentration has exerted an equalisation effect in terms of the relative importance of trade within and across the different country groups in the EU12 area, i.e. the core EU6 and the northern and southern peripheries, respectively. Nevertheless, we also observe a polarisation effect due to the change in multinationality, which outweighs the equalisation effect. Hence, the core countries' and the northern periphery's intra-EU goods trade activity were increased through this development at cost of the southern EU economies in relative terms.
One main reason behind this development is that the southern EU periphery is specialised in industries, where transportation costs are high. According to both theory and evidence, a change in multinationality in such industries exerts a stronger negative impact than in their low-transport costs counterparts.
Due to missing data, the present research cannot resolve the question of whether increased transnational production activity of firms (i.e. integration in terms of multi-plant production) within the EU compensates the disin-tegration in terms of trade of the southern EU. Consequently, the results cannot be interpreted in terms of welfare consequences. Nonetheless, the paper may contribute to the discussion about the effects of the trade cost reducing and multinationality enforcing measures such as intended by the single market program and provides insights that -at least in the short run -the interaction between trade cost reduction, market concentration and multinationality is important. It demonstrates, to which extent an EU12 country's specialisation in goods production, where transport costs are high and relatively persistent (such as in the southern EU) implies that trade volumes react more sensitive to increased EU-wide multinational activity.
Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1
This can be seen from the first derivatives of (7) with respect to the variables of interest:
4b(e n + 1) > 0 (10)
since positive exports (nx i > 0) require
and
The latter holds true for all θ > 0, since
As (12) Exports (1990 Exports ( , 1993 Exports ( , 1997 Standard errors in parentheses. -***) significant at 1%; **) significant at 5%; *) significant at 10%. Fixed Effects Models 1) "yes" ("no") indicate, whether the significant empirical findings are in accordance with (rejecting) the theoretical priors; "?" indicates that the estimated effects are insignificant. -2) The reported coefficients and standard errors are equivalent to those in Table 1 , since the respective variables do not take part in the interaction terms. Standard errors in parentheses. -***) significant at 1 percent; *) significant at 10 percent. Observed growth in % of a) This is the percentage point difference in the foreign to domestic country unit labour cost ratio. It is calculated on the basis of the foreign unit labour cost as percent of domestic unit labour cost. -b) The underlying increase in concentration in the average industry is 0.43% and that of multinationality is 13. 10% (1990-1997) . The equalization effect of concentration means: a < (b+c+d+e+f). The polarization effect of multinationality means: (d+e+f)<0.
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